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Looking through conduit FDI in search of
ultimate investors – a probabilistic approach
Bruno Casella*
This paper presents a novel computational method to determine the distribution 
of ultimate investors in bilateral FDI stock. The approach employs results from 
the probabilistic theory of absorbing Markov chains. The method allows for 
the estimation of a bilateral matrix that provides inward positions by ultimate 
counterparts for over 100 recipient countries, covering 95% of total FDI stock and 
including many developing countries. Reconstructing the global FDI network by 
ultimate investors enables a more accurate and complete snapshot of international 
production than do standalone bilateral FDI statistics. This has considerable 
implications for policymaking. It also provides more nuanced context to some 
contemporary developments such as the trade tensions between the United 
States, China and others, as well as Brexit.
Keywords: ultimate investors, bilateral FDI, conduit FDI, international production, 
absorbing Markov chains.
1. Introduction
1.1 International production and the challenge of ultimate investors
For many years multinational enterprises (MNEs) established their international 
production presence predominantly through foreign direct investment (FDI), building 
an internalized system of foreign affiliates directly owned and managed by the 
parent company. Today’s globalized production, however, is much more diversified. 
Companies can exert control over a foreign business through non-equity modes 
(NEMs) of international production, such as contract manufacturing or services 
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outsourcing (World Investment Report, 2011). The deepening of global value 
chains has also greatly expanded, fragmented and blurred the traditional sphere 
of influence of MNEs (from equity-based control to network-based coordination) 
(World Investment Report, 2013; Zhan et al., 2013). At the same time, the ‘classic’ 
motivations for MNEs’ foreign investment (resource-seeking, efficiency-seeking, 
market-seeking) have broadened, with the scope for financial and tax-driven 
operations growing (World Investment Report, 2015; Bolwijn et al., 2018). FDI 
financialization, in turn, has resulted in increased complexity in MNE ownership 
relationships, with the creation of ever deeper and more convoluted corporate 
structures (World Investment Report, 2016). The proliferation and hybridization 
of modes of international production have been considerably facilitated by 
digitalization and the rise of intangibles, which have made international business 
much ‘lighter’, hence more flexible and mobile (World Investment Report, 2017; 
Casella and Formenti, 2018). These trends have all emerged or been powerfully 
intensified over the last twenty years, marking complexity as a defining feature of 
the current context of international production.
One of the great challenges for the international community in this context is to devise 
meaningful ways to describe and measure international production, a necessary 
condition to inform effective policymaking for inclusive and sustainable development 
(World Investment Report, 2012, 2014). Such analytical efforts require ever richer 
and more diversified data equipment. In recent years, UNCTAD has complemented 
its core database of FDI statistics from the national Balance of Payments (BoP) 
with other data sources such as GVC and value-added trade data (UNCTAD-Eora 
GVC database),1 firm level data (from commercial databases, ORBIS Bureau Van 
Dijk and Refinitiv), project-level data on FDI greenfield projects and cross-border 
mergers and acquisitions (from fDi Markets and Refinitiv, respectively), and survey-
based data (foreign affiliates statistics, mainly from Eurostat and the United States 
Bureau of Economic Analysis). Nevertheless, FDI statistics from the BoP remain 
the backbone of most empirical analysis on international production. For many 
developing countries they are the only available data on the activity of MNEs.
Discussion is ongoing on the extent to which FDI statistics effectively describe the 
international presence and operations of MNEs (for some references, see section 
1.2). A recent paper (Casella, 2019), takes stock of this debate and discusses 
the pros and cons of using FDI statistics to describe international production. In 
particular, it argues that the impact of conduit FDI on bilateral FDI positions is a 
major barrier to a reconciliation between FDI statistics and international production. 
The main goal of this paper is to make a contribution to overcome this barrier.
1 http://worldmrio.com/unctadgvc/
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Conduit FDI arises when an MNE investing from home country A in host country B 
establishes an intermediate step through a third country C. The investment transits 
first from A to C, and only then, from C to B where it is deployed as productive 
investment (for example a plant). The intermediate step through C is merely financial, 
as in country C no real ‘productive’ investment takes place, and is generally 
qualified as conduit FDI (but also ‘pass-through capital’, Borga and Caliandro, 
2018; ‘indirect FDI’, Kalotay, 2012; ‘offshore FDI’, Haberly and Wójcik, 2015). Most 
conduit FDI in the world takes place through a limited set of jurisdictions that act 
as global FDI hubs. These countries allow MNEs to set up Special Purpose Entities 
(SPEs), which are investment vehicles specifically conceived to optimize MNEs’ 
investment strategies, both from a financial and fiscal perspective. However, a 
certain limited amount of conduit FDI can take place through operational (non-SPE) 
entities in standard jurisdictions (Borga and Caliandro, 2018). On the other hand, 
not all FDI involving offshore investment hubs are conduit or financial (Bolwijn et al., 
2018). UNCTAD (World Investment Report, 2015; Bolwijn et al., 2018) estimates 
that between 30% and 50% of total FDI stock is routed through investment hubs 
as conduit FDI.2
A large share of conduit FDI creates a biased picture of international production. 
In the inward case (the direction of the analysis in this paper) not only do conduit 
FDI inflate inward stock into investment hubs, but they also amplify the role of 
investment hubs as investors in all other jurisdictions. This is the result of double-
counting in the international FDI network: investment does not really originate from 
the conduit jurisdiction but somewhere else, further up in the investment chain. As 
a consequence, the increasing role of conduit FDI has widened the gap between 
bilateral FDI positions by direct investors (as reported by standard bilateral FDI) and 
those by ultimate investors. Figure 1 shows the problem for France and Germany, two 
countries that report complementary FDI positions by ultimate investors (currently 
only fourteen countries provide statistics by ultimate investors; see also figure 2). 
Compared with the distribution of ultimate investors, bilateral FDI inflates the role of 
large European investment hubs, such as Luxembourg and the Netherlands, while 
it depresses the share of some major investor countries such as the United States. 
What is striking is the magnitude of the gap. For example, the combined share of 
Luxembourg and the Netherlands makes up 41% of total bilateral FDI in Germany, 
and the United States only 8%. The ultimate investor view reverts the picture: the 
share of the United States rises to 21%, and Luxembourg and the Netherlands 
combined make up only 14% of German inward stock. Similar considerations apply 
to France and all other countries for which data allow comparison.
2 This order of magnitude is also confirmed by other studies, such as Haberly and Wójcik (2015).
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Figure 1. Comparison between the distributions of ultimate investors 
 and direct investors (Per cent)
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The outcomes illustrated by figure 1 mean standard bilateral FDI data cannot 
uncover ultimate investor relations. The need for bilateral statistics by ultimate 
investors as a complement to standard bilateral FDI is now largely acknowledged 
by the international community. In recent years, as the role of conduit FDI became 
increasingly unwieldy,3 there has been growing pressure to report data on ultimate 
investors. The 2008 OECD Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment 
(OECD, 2009) recommends that “it is strongly encouraged that supplemental 
inward FDI positions be compiled on an ultimate investing country (UIC) basis” 
(page 110). Nevertheless, progress in the reporting of positions based on ultimate 
investors has been slow. By 2016 data, only fourteen OECD countries reported 
FDI stock by ultimate investors. Figure 2 shows the current status of reporting and 
progress made. Notwithstanding the relevance of statistics on ultimate investors 
for individual countries, the current sample of reporting countries is too limited 
and developed countries-centred to draw any representative conclusions about 
ultimate investors at the global level. And, critically, the pace at which developing 
countries are aligning to recommended standards does not hint at any meaningful 
progress in the near future.
Against this backdrop, the main question is whether it is possible to estimate the 
distribution of ultimate investors for a large number of recipient countries, including 
developing economies. Competent international organizations are actively seeking 
analytical solutions for this challenging task (see review of the recent studies of 
the IMF Damgaard and Elkjaer, 2017 and OECD Borga and Caliandro, 2018 in 
the next section). The transition from reported FDI positions by direct investors 
to estimated FDI positions by ultimate investors requires: i. To identify the conduit 
component, i.e. that part of total inward FDI in recipient countries generated by 
double-counting; ii. To reallocate conduit FDI to genuine investors; this second step 
implies to find a way to look through conduit FDI, in search of ultimate investors.
This paper proposes a probabilistic-based methodology to deal with these 
challenges. The main contribution and the novelty of the approach are to provide 
a rigorous, analytical way to look through conduit FDI (step ii above), while the 
identification of the conduit component (step i) is exogenous, relying either on 
reported data on SPEs (in the spirit of World Investment Report, 2015), or on 
available estimation methods (for example Bolwijn et al., 2018; Damgaard and 
Elkjaer, 2017; Borga and Caliandro, 2018). The final outcome is a new bilateral 
matrix providing inward positions by ultimate counterparts for over 100 recipient 
countries, covering 95% of total FDI stock and including developing countries.
3 UNCTAD World Investment Report (2015) estimates an increase of 50% in the share of conduit FDI in 
just ten years, between the beginning and the end of 2000s.
114 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS Volume 26, 2019, Number 1
Notes: Status as reported by the OECD (https://stats.oecd.org). Other countries reporting data on ultimate investors include the 
United Kingdom (not reflected by OECD statistics, but see https://www.ons.gov.uk). Brazil also reports some information on 
ultimate investors up to 2015 in its latest FDI report, but has no publicly available data (see https://www.bcb.gov.br/Rex/
CensoCE/ingl/FDIReport2016.pdf).
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Figure 2. FDI positions by ultimate investors: status of reporting
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The availability of a fairly comprehensive picture of ultimate investors opens a range 
of important analytical and policy applications. Standard bilateral FDI provide an 
important map of financial relationships between countries, exposing where financial 
claims and liabilities are created and when they are held. However, when the focus is 
on international production, the ultimate investor view reveals the relevant underlying 
patterns: where the investment decision was taken, where the capital originated 
from, and who bears the risks and reaps the benefits of the investment. This has 
considerable implications for the actions and policies of countries. For instance, the 
paper unveils the potential impact of a trade war between U.S. and China on U.S. 
MNEs intra-firm trade. According to 2016 inward FDI statistics reported by China, 
the U.S. share of total Chinese FDI stock is a meagre 3%. Yet, the reconstruction 
by ultimate investors establishes the U.S. as the biggest foreign investor in China, 
with a 12% share of total inward Chinese stock. The underlying exposure of U.S. 
firms to U.S. trade barriers on China therefore only becomes evident when inward 
Chinese investment is seen through the lens of ultimate investors.
115Looking through conduit FDI in search of ultimate investors – a probabilistic approach
1.2 Literature review
A key motivation of this paper is to improve the consistency between FDI 
statistics and the ‘real’ dynamics of international production. Concerns about the 
inadequacy of FDI statistics have been raised by Lipsey (2007), Beugelsdijk et 
al. (2010), Leino and Ali-Yrkkö (2014), and Blanchard and Acalin (2016). On the 
other hand, Wacker (2013) and Casella (2019) support the (cautious) use of FDI 
statistics to analyse patterns of international production. Fukui and Lakatos (2012), 
Ramondo and Rodriguez-Clare (2013) and Federico (2016) effectively employ FDI 
statistics to impute missing data of foreign affiliates operations, in efforts to build 
comprehensive databases of multinational production. FDI statistics are also found 
to be linked to other meaningful measures of international production such as GVC-
related indicators (Zhan et al., 2013; Martínez-Galán and Fontoura, 2019).
In a BoP context, the problem of conduit FDI has been analysed by World Investment 
Report (2015), Haberly and Wójcik (2015), Bolwijn et al. (2018) and Janský and 
Palanský (2018). These studies arrive at similar estimates of the size of conduit FDI 
– in the range of 30% to 50% of total FDI stock. The emphasis in these studies is 
on the link between the conduit jurisdictions and the destination countries where 
operations take place (and profit shifting potentially occurs). For example, Bolwijn 
et al. (2018) estimate that exposure to conduit FDI from offshore investment hubs is 
responsible for a loss of government revenues for developing countries in the order 
of $100 billion annually, as a consequence BEPS (base erosion and profit shifting). 
These analyses do not go beyond the conduit component to address the problem 
of the ‘real’ origin of the investment.
Firm-level literature has also made important contributions to the research on 
conduit FDI in the context of the analysis of complex corporate structures. UNCTAD 
firm-level analysis in the World Investment Report (2016) shows that about 40% of 
foreign affiliates are part of multi-step ownership chains involving shareholders from 
different countries (i.e. they have multiple passports), a number consistent with 
the estimated share of conduit FDI discussed above. Multi-passport entities are 
responsible for investor nationality mismatches, a notion recalling the challenge of 
the ultimate investors at the firm-level (World Investment Report, 2016; Alabrese and 
Casella, 2019). The increasing availability of firm-level data on ownership structures 
and relationships has allowed for network theory and big data algorithms to be 
applied to map corporate networks of ownership and control at a massive, global 
scale (Vitali et al., 2011; Rungi et al., 2017; Garcia-Bernardo et al., 2017). The study 
of Garcia-Bernardo et al. (2017) is particularly relevant because of its emphasis 
on the role of offshore and conduit jurisdictions, including the useful distinction 
between conduit and sink jurisdictions. Finally, firm-level drivers and determinants 
of complex ownership structures are explored by a large empirical literature. 
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Since the seminal paper of La Porta et al. (1999), studies have analysed factors 
influencing the financial and investment choices of MNEs that may in turn affect the 
structure of ownership chains. Taxation features prominently (Altshuler and Grubert, 
2003; Desai et al., 2002, 2006; Mintz and Weichenrieder, 2010; Grubert, 2012), 
but other considerations also matter, including financing, risk management, policy 
and institutional issues and even historic accident (Desai et al., 2004, 2003, 2007; 
Lewellen and Robinson, 2013; Dyreng et al., 2015).
Zooming in on the core subject of this paper – the analysis of ultimate investors’ 
relationships – Kalotay (2012) provides a qualitative review of some relevant 
statistical and policy challenges. Tissot (2016) advocates for a nationality-based 
approach to national statistics collection, to complement the current residency-
based approach. Interestingly, in the paper of Tissot, the case for integrating 
standard FDI statistics with consolidated statistics based on the nationality of 
ultimate investors is motivated by the need to better account for systemic risks 
and inter-linkages in the global financial system rather than by the desire to analyse 
international production more accurately. Along the same line of Tissot (2016), in a 
thorough treatment of pass-through capital, Borga and Caliandro (2018) developed 
a comprehensive statistical framework for consolidated FDI statistics based on the 
nationality of MNEs. Their analytical proposal builds on a mixed approach, whereby 
the share of pass-through capital is estimated using firm-level data from ORBIS and 
applied to official (outward) FDI statistics to compute an estimate of the amount 
of conduit FDI at the country-level. The estimation step is affected by significant 
heterogeneity in ORBIS coverage of firm-level data across countries (with poor or 
almost no coverage for many developing countries). One very interesting point of 
the paper is the focus on capital passing through non-SPE entities (in the order of 
25% of non-SPE FDI stock, according to the paper estimate), an important and 
often overlooked analytical element in the treatment of conduit FDI. At the current 
status, the analytical proposal of Borga and Caliandro covers only the estimation of 
conduit FDI; however, the possibility to extend the methodology to derive statistics 
by ultimate investors is mentioned as an avenue for future research.
To my knowledge, one study only, IMF Damgaard and Elkjaer (2017), has taken the 
analysis of conduit FDI as far as the estimation of an alternative network of bilateral FDI 
broken down by ultimate investors. The paper makes three important contributions. 
First, it provides an exhaustive account of the main statistical challenges related to 
bilateral FDI, namely the presence of large bilateral asymmetries, the role of special 
purpose entities and the breakdown of FDI by ultimate investing economy. Second, 
it introduces a way to estimate the SPE component in FDI statistics for countries 
that do not report such information; this proposal adds to the other available options 
for the estimation of conduit FDI (e.g. World Investment Report, 2015; Bolwijn et 
al., 2018). Finally, for the first time in the literature, is provided an analytical way to 
estimate the distribution of ultimate investors.
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I will focus on the last point, the most relevant for the purpose of this paper. The main 
idea of Damgaard and Elkjaer is to assign to each investor (i.e. the counterparts in a 
inward FDI set-up) an adjustment factor based on twelve countries that report data 
on ultimate investors (as of 2015). The adjustment factor is the average ratio across 
the twelve reporting countries between the counterpart’s size as direct investor 
(from standard bilateral FDI) and its size as ultimate investor (from countries’ 
complementary reporting). In other words, for any (reporting) recipient country, the 
distribution of ultimate investors is calculated from the bilateral FDI statistics, by 
applying to each counterpart an adjustment factor reflecting the ratio between its 
weight as direct investor and its weight as ultimate investor, as retrieved from the 
sample of countries reporting both views.4 The approach essentially applies to all 
countries in the world the same relationship between the distribution of bilateral 
FDI and the distribution of ultimate investors of twelve OECD countries (at most).5 
This extrapolating step has some critical limitations. The role of some jurisdictions 
to channel conduit FDI may be specific to a recipient country or region (regional 
hubs).6 In these cases, adjusting the distribution of all countries in the world as if 
they behave like the twelve developed countries in the reporting sample would be 
highly misleading.7 A second limitation is the caps on the adjustment factors that, 
for a subset of bilateral positions, may drive the results. The resort to caps is due to 
the fact that the computation of the adjustment factor is based on a small number 
4 For a particular investor, say A, an adjustment factor equal to 1 means that on average the (twelve) 
reference countries have reported the same amount of investment from A in the standard FDI view 
and in the view by ultimate investors. In this case, for all other recipient countries outside the reference 
sample, the amount of FDI from A remains unchanged in the ultimate investor view. An adjustment 
factor below 1 means that, on average across the reporting sample, A is a larger ultimate investor than 
direct investor. In this case, bilateral FDI from A will be adjusted upward in the ultimate investor view. 
Similarly, if the adjustment factor is above 1, bilateral FDI will be adjusted downward in the transition 
to the view by ultimate investors.
5 Coverage of investors across all twelve reporting recipients is not homogeneous; therefore FDI 
positions for a specific investor may be reported by only a subset of the twelve countries.
6 The importance of regional hubs is well documented, for example in Haberly and Wójcik (2015).
7 One particularly challenging case, acknowledged also by the authors (page 19), is Hong Kong. As the 
main offshore hub for Chinese investment, Hong Kong has massive role as direct investor into China 
and Asian countries in general but it is expected to be less relevant as ultimate investor. However, 
given that the conduit role of Hong Kong is limited in the context of OECD countries, the adjustment 
factor calculated by Damgaard and Elkjaer is close to 1, i.e. it does not differentiate substantially 
between Hong Kong as direct investor and as ultimate investor. In other words, in the case of Hong 
Kong, the method fails to look through, missing out one of the most relevant conduit structures in 
the global economy. Based on the data accompanying the paper, the estimated share of Hong Kong 
as ultimate investor in China is 46% of total investment in China, a very large share, not substantially 
different from its share as direct investor, as reported by China, at 48%. The link between Hong 
Kong and China is not the only important conduit link involving investment to developing countries, 
potentially not captured by a view driven by OECD countries. Others include for example jurisdictions 
like Singapore (conduit to Asian countries) or Mauritius (to African countries and India).
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of countries, hence it is exposed to outliers owing to country specificities.8 Finally, 
tailoring the estimation so closely to the countries already reporting the distribution 
of ultimate investors raises questions about the validation procedure based on 
reported data (estimates may closely match reported data by construction).
*  *  *
The proposal I present in this paper is based on a different and original approach. It 
taps into the fact that bilateral FDI data, available for a large set of countries, provide 
the one-step (or direct) distribution in the investment chain. The combination of 
these distributions and the (exogenous) assumptions on conduit FDI provides 
a transition rule to link backward final recipient countries to ultimate investors, 
effectively looking through conduit FDI. In a nutshell, FDI distributions provide 
the overall exposure of a recipient country j to direct investment from an investor 
country i, while assumptions on conduit FDI define whether direct investor i is an 
intermediate or an ultimate investor. In the former case, the investment process 
iterates until an ultimate investor arises. Framing this simple idea within the 
probabilistic setting of absorbing Markov chains allows to analytically derive the 
distribution of ultimate investors. The main intuition behind the approach as well 
as its formal elaboration are presented in section 2, the core part of the paper. 
Importantly, this approach is independent from reported statistics on ultimate 
investors, i.e. it is not driven by a limited sample of developed countries.9 Instead, 
reported distributions on ultimate investors are employed for a validation of the 
methodology, with promising results (section 3). Due to its novelty, this approach is 
susceptible to significant future refinements; some possible directions are outlined 
in section 4. The policy implications are potentially far-reaching, as argued in the 
concluding section (section 5).
8 The paper mentions two different caps on adjustment factors. i. A cap between 0.33 and 3 applying 
to all standard jurisdictions to avoid extreme adjustments; ii. A cap between 0.2 and 1, applying to 
low-tax economies, to limit their size as ultimate investors. 
9 This is an important improvement on Damgaard and Elkjaer (2017). For example, unlike their paper 
(but in agreement with the expectations), the estimated share of Hong Kong as ultimate investor 
in China, at 12%, is substantially lower than its share as direct investor at 48% (see also discussion 
in footnote 7).
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2.  A new approach to determine the distribution of the ultimate 
investors
2.1 A simulation exercise
For illustrative purposes, I first present the main idea of the paper in a simplified 
simulated setting.
Suppose the presence of five (recipient) countries A, B, C, D and E, with two sets of 
information. (i) First, the bilateral FDI reported by each recipient country; (ii) Second, 
some prior information on conduit FDI. For example, assume that countries D and E 
are always conduit jurisdictions, i.e. intermediate steps in a long investment chain; 
on the other hand, the three remaining countries A, B and C are always the origin 
of the investment (non-conduit).
The simulation exercise consists of using (i) bilateral information on direct investors 
and (ii) assumptions on conduit jurisdictions, to trace back the chain of investment 
from the final (‘lowest’) recipient up to the ultimate (‘highest’) investor. Starting 
from the recipient country j (any country A, B, C, D, E), the simulation employs 
the distribution of bilateral FDI reported by j to simulate a direct investor i. If the 
direct investor is a conduit jurisdiction (i = D or E), it iterates the process with 
country i now acting as reporting recipient: a direct investor to i will be simulated 
from the distribution of bilateral FDI reported by i, adding an upper layer in the 
investment chain. If the direct investor is a non-conduit jurisdiction (i = A, B or 
C), the investment chain stops and the highest simulated direct investor coincides 
with the ultimate investor. In this simplified setting, ultimate investors can only be 
the non-conduit jurisdictions A, B and C. I will refer to this process as the reversed 
investment process, because it reverts the usual ‘top-down’ investment direction 
(from the investor to the recipient). Figure 3 illustrates the dynamics of the reversed 
investment process.
Applying a standard Monte Carlo approach (Robert and Casella, 2004) will provide 
for any country j a suitable approximation  of the distribution of its ultimate 
investors i, say pu (j, i), as the number N of iterations becomes larger:
(1)
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where  is the event that country i is ultimate investor to the recipient 
country j and  is an indicator function taking value 1 if event A occurs 
at the n-th trial of the simulation, otherwise it takes value 0. By construction of 
the simulation process,  is positive when investor countries i are non-conduit 
(A, B, C) and 0 for conduit jurisdictions (i=D, E). Also,  respects the unit condition 
of probability distributions, i.e.  (j, i) = 1, as required.
I now relax assumption (ii) on conduit FDI. Instead of dividing jurisdictions in conduit 
and non-conduit, the simulation allows for a conduit component in each country 
(figure 4). In other words, for each direct investor country i, a known share of 
investment is made through conduit entities (for example SPEs). This approach 
is more realistic because even in large offshore investment hubs there may be 
a (limited) portion of ‘original’ investment (Bolwijn et al., 2018); and, vice versa, 
standard jurisdiction can be occasionally used to channel pass-through investment 
(Borga and Caliandro, 2018). The first simulation (figure 3) is a special case, where 
the conduit share can only be equal to 0 (countries A, B and C) or 1 (countries D 
and E).
The simulation of the reversed investment process in this more general setting 
requires an additional step. Every time a direct investor i is sampled, the process 
simulates its conduit status from a 0-1 (Bernoulli) distribution (‘conduit’ – 
‘non-conduit’). If the outcome is ‘conduit’, a further direct investor is sampled, 
otherwise the simulation stops and the highest direct investor coincides with the 
ultimate investor. Unlike the first simulation, ultimate investors can be any country 
A, B, C, D, E. Application of Monte Carlo (1) then provides a suitable approximation 
of the distribution of ultimate investors. 
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2.2 Preliminaries: Absorbing Markov chains
This section provides a friendly introduction to the theory of absorbing Markov 
chains, strictly limited to the elements relevant for application in this paper. A more 
comprehensive and rigorous background can be found in many textbooks on 
stochastic processes, for example Grinstead and Snell (1997) (chapter 11), for a 
basic reading, or Stroock (2005) for a more advanced treatment.
Definition 1 (Markov chain). A Markov chain is a sequence of random variables (a 
stochastic process) in a discrete time frame {Xn}n=1, 2,... satisfying the following 
Markov property:
for any n=0, 1,... (2)
The probability distribution defined by (2) is called transition probability. The Markov 
property states the defining feature of Markov chains: at any step n, the behavior 
of the process at the further iteration (n+1) depends only on the current state Xn. 
The history of the process {X0, X1,..., Xn-1} does not have any impact on its future 
behavior Xn+1, given the knowledge of its current status Xn.10 For this reason, 
Markov processes are also said to be memoryless. The underlying idea is that 
the present status condenses all the past information needed to predict the future 
behavior of the process.
A Markov chain is homogeneous when the transition probability (2) is the same for 
all n (i.e. it does not depend on the ‘time’). Formally:
for any n=1, 2,... (3)
10 Here the familiar categories of ‘past’, ‘present’ and ‘future’ are used for descriptive purposes but 
do not necessarily refer to physical time. Often Markov chains describe phenomena taking place 
at a (discrete) physical time, but sometimes they just refer to an abstract sequence of events. This 
characteristic is particularly important in the application of this study (section 2.3) where the sequence 
described by the relevant Markov chain Xn is not driven by physical time; indeed to some extent it 
reverts the physical time-ﬂow.
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The state-space of a Markov chain {Xn} is the set of all possible values that the 
sequence of random variables X0, X1,... can take with positive probability. The state-
space is finite if the Markov chain can assume only a finite number M of values. As 
a consequence of (2) and (3), the probabilistic behavior of a homogeneous Markov 
chain on a finite state-space, say {a1, a2,..., aM}, is fully determined by an initial 
condition {X0 = x0} and a transition matrix P with dimension [M x M] and generic 
elements {p (ak;ah)}k, h=1, 2,..., M defined by (3). The rows of the transition matrix 
P identify the current state while the columns identify the next state; the elements of 
the matrix are the probabilities to move from a given current state to any next state.
A state aj of a Markov chain is called absorbing if it is impossible to leave it, i.e. 
it satisfies:
for any i ≠ j and any n = 0, 1,... (4)
In Markov chains, a state that is not absorbing is defined transient.
Definition 2 (absorbing Markov chain). A discrete stochastic process {Xn}n=1, 2,... 
is an absorbing Markov chain if it satisfies the Markov property (2), it has at least 
one absorbing state and if, from every state, it is possible to reach an absorbing 
state.
Definition 3 (standard form of transition matrix). Suppose to have an homogeneous 
absorbing Markov chain {Xn} with finite state space {a1, a2,..., aM}, such that K 
states are absorbing and the others M - K are non-absorbing (or transient). Then 
the transition matrix P is said to be in a standard form if absorbing states precede 
the transient states in the matrix representation:
(5)
where, by definition, I is a [K x K] unit matrix, while 0 is a [K x (M - K)] null matrix. 
The n-th transition matrix Pn is then defined as:
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(6)
The focus here is on the limiting matrix P* describing the long-term behavior of Pn, 
when n 
(7)
Then the key result on the distribution of the limiting transition matrix P* follows.
Main result (limiting distribution of absorbing Markov chains). If {Xn} is an absorbing 
Markov chain with transition matrix P in the standard form (5), then the limiting 
transition matrix P* is given by:
(8)
such that:
(9)
with R and Q defined by (5). The matrix F := (I − Q)−1 is called the fundamental 
matrix of the absorbing Markov chain {Xn} . The result (8) and (9) provides a nice 
and simple characterization of the long-term behavior of an absorbing Markov chain 
{Xn}. It implies that the Markov chain will always be absorbed in the long-run (it will 
end up in one absorbing state with probability 1) and it provides the probability of 
each absorbing state, given any possible starting state (transient, by definition). 
126 TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS Volume 26, 2019, Number 1
This result will be the key to determine the distribution of ultimate investors in the 
application to bilateral FDI stock presented in the next section.
2.3 Harnessing Markov chains to locate ultimate investors
Main proposition
This section leverages some of the results from the probabilistic theory of absorbing 
Markov chains to compute the distribution of ultimate investors in bilateral FDI 
positions. The main proposition is the same as illustrated by the simulation exercise 
in section 2.1, i.e. to use (i) bilateral FDI and (ii) assumptions on conduit FDI to 
define a suitable and realistic transition rule linking backward recipient countries 
to ultimate investor countries. Remarkably, while simulation is a useful and intuitive 
way to approach this problem, the actual computation of the distribution of ultimate 
investors does not require simulation and Monte Carlo (1) but it can be derived 
analytically. This derivation is the main objective of this section.
As a first step, the reversed investment process, introduced in section 2.1 (in 
particular the version of figure 4), has to be reframed and formalized within the 
probabilistic setting of absorbing Markov chains (section 2.2). It is important to 
state ahead that this approach is only instrumentally probabilistic. Probability theory 
is used here merely to address a computational problem: the procedure does not 
require any probabilistic assumption regarding the ‘future states of the world’. 
Likewise, no formal definition of a probability space (Ω, F, P) is needed to perform 
a purely computational task.
I model the reversed investment process as a Markov chain, say {Xn}. The initial 
state of the chain X0 = x0 is the recipient country of the investment (or final 
destination). X1 is the direct (or immediate) investor country into X0; X2 is the 
direct investor into X1. More generally, Xn+1 is the direct investor into Xn. Intuitively, 
the ultimate investors in X0 will be a set of countries, say Xu, acting as steady or 
limiting states for the process; formally, for any given investment path {X0 = x0, 
X1 = x1, X2 = x2,...}, there exists n such that xn = xn+h := Xu for all h = 1, 2,... . 
This intuition will become clearer later in the section.
Formalization of the Markov chain
I proceed now to the description of {Xn}, by defining first the state-space of the 
process, i.e. the possible values (states) that the variables {Xn} can take at any 
step n. Then, I characterize its transition matrix: the set of probabilities governing 
the transition from one state Xn to the next state Xn+1, including conditions at the 
starting states X0 to initialize the process.
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Let M be the total number of countries in the perimeter of interest; in this context, 
all countries for which the distribution of the ultimate investors is needed. For each 
country i = 1, 2,..., M, the process allows two states, a transient state iT and an 
absorbing state iA. In the logic of the reversed investment process, the two states 
can be described as follows:
• Transient state iT := ‘country i has a direct investor’
• Absorbing state iA := ‘country i has no direct investor’
At any iteration, the Markov chain {Xn} can then take M x 2 different values, each 
corresponding to one country i = 1, 2,..., M and one state, transit (T) or absorbing 
(A). Thus, the state-space of the Markov chain {Xn} is given by {iT ,iA}i=1, 2,..., M.
I am now ready to define the probabilistic structure of {Xn}, or equivalently its 
transition matrix P := Pr(Xn+1 | Xn) of dimension [2M x 2M] with generic element:
  (10)i, j = 1, 2,..., M; h, k = T, A  
where  represents the event that country i in state k is direct 
investor in recipient country j in state h.
The most convenient way to represent the transition matrix P is through four sub-
matrix blocks of dimension M x M:
  (11)
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with generic elements defined, for any row j and column i, as follows:
otherwise
if
  (12)
  (13)
  (14)
  (15)
In (12) – (15), for any country i, j = 1, 2,..., M, pd (j, i) defines the probability that 
country i is direct investor in recipient country j (direct investment probability of i 
given j) and pc(i) is the probability that direct investment from country i occurs 
through a conduit entity, or equivalently, that country i is in a conduit state (conduit 
probability of i):
a. Direct investment probability of i given j:
  (16)
{ Country i is a direct investor in recipient j }
b. Conduit probability of i:
{ Direct investment from country i is conduit }
  (17)
From equations (12) and (13), when the reversed investment process reaches an 
investor country j in an absorbing state A, it stops there with country j qualifying 
as ultimate investor. Instead, equations (14) and (15) describe the transition of the 
process in presence of conduit states. When investor country j at iteration n is 
conduit, the reversed investment process continues, assigning a positive probability 
to a foreign direct investor (i into j) at the upper investment level n+1. Such direct 
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investment from country i can be made either by a conduit entity or by a non-
conduit entity. The probability of the former is given by (15), as the product between 
the direct investment probability of i given j, pd (j, i), and the conduit probability of i, 
pc(i). Similarly, the probability that the direct investment from i into j is non-conduit 
(14) is derived as the product between the direct investment probability of i given j 
and the complementary of the conduit probability of i, 1 − pc(i). Finally, the definition 
of the Markov chain {Xn} is completed by adding the initial condition:
  (18)
which ensures that the possible set of initial states is limited to transient states only; 
this condition is needed in order to initialize the investment process. Notice that 
the sum of each row in the transition matrix (11), is equal to 1 as required; for any 
j = 1, 2,..., M, from (12) and (14):
  (19)
and from (14) and (15):
  (20)
The key result
Expressions (12) to (15) define an absorbing Markov chain, with a transition matrix 
P (11) in the same standard form as (5):
  (21)
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From (8) and (9) the long-run distribution of the Markov chain {Xn} is given by:
  (22)
where R* = F * PT, A and F is the fundamental matrix of the Markov chain defined 
by (9):
  (23)
The rows of the matrix are the initial states X0 (recipient countries); the columns 
are the final states X* (ultimate investors). The interpretation of the limiting matrix 
P* (22) in terms of the reversed investment process {Xn} is the following: from 
any recipient country j = 1, 2,..., M, after a sufficiently large number of (reversed) 
investment steps, the process will select an ultimate investor (modelled as an 
absorbing state) with probability 1 (blocks I and R* in the left side of the matrix 
(22)). The initial condition (18) limiting X0 to transient states (blocks R* and 0 at the 
bottom of (22)) ensures that the investment process actually moves away from the 
recipient country, or in other words, that the initial investment link is foreign.
In this context, the sub-matrix R* of dimension [M x M] is the key result of this 
approach, providing for each recipient country j = 1, 2,..., M (by row) the distribution 
of the ultimate investors i = 1, 2,..., M (by columns). Formally,
  (24)
where, for any given recipient country j,
  (25)
defines the probability that country i is its ultimate investor.
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3. An empirical application
Parameters:  d  and  c
The purpose of this section is twofold. The first objective is to exemplify how the 
approach works in concrete applications with real numbers. The second is to 
validate the approach, providing sound, although preliminary, evidence that results 
are consistent with reported data on ultimate investors (available for a handful of 
countries). This application is mainly illustrative; it does not have the ambition to 
provide the optimal way to compute the distribution of ultimate investors. Yet, it 
gives a clear indication that the probabilistic method proposed in this paper is a 
viable option and a promising avenue to obtain a more accurate gauge of ultimate 
investors. Further research and empirical work to refine both the inputs into, and the 
settings of, the computational machine are expected to yield further improvements 
in the results.
The first step of an empirical application is to assign the parameters of the reversed 
investment process modelled as the Markov chain {Xn} (section 2). This essentially 
means defining the transition matrix (11), according to (12)–(15). While (12) and (13) 
are given by definition, the valorization of (14) and (15) requires assigning values to 
pd (j, i) (16) and pc(i) (17), for all countries i, j in the perimeter of interest.
For the direct investment probability pd , the obvious available choice is to use 
investor countries’ shares in inward bilateral FDI data. Thus, the parameter d 
assigned to the target probability pd is defined as follows:
  (26)
where FDI (j, i) is the amount of FDI reported by recipient country j from investor i. 
For any recipient country j, d (j, i) represents the share of investment from country i 
in total FDI stock in country j (as reported by country j).
The treatment of the conduit probability pc is less straightforward. The application 
in this section relies on a refined version of the approach to sizing conduit FDI in 
Bolwijn et al. (2018), combining data on SPEs reported by countries and estimates 
of the conduit component through the implied investment method. The appendix 
describes the approach in some detail and reports the resulting estimates of conduit 
probabilities c(i) (table 1).
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Results and validation
I use official inward bilateral FDI stock for 2016 (as reported by UNCTAD, the OECD 
and the IMF),11 to assign values to d (j, i) according to (26). The values of the 
conduit probabilities c (reported in table 1 in the appendix) are derived from available 
information on outward SPEs, complemented by estimates from the application of the 
implied investment method as described in the appendix and in Bolwijn et al. (2018).
The comparison with reported data on ultimate investors allows to appreciate to 
what extent the methodology contributes to covering the gap – sizable for most 
recipient countries – between the breakdown of FDI positions by direct investors and 
by ultimate investors. The analysis is based on FDI positions by direct and ultimate 
investors reported by the OECD,12 for twelve countries (Canada, Czech Republic, 
Estonia, France, Finland, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Italy, Poland, Switzerland and 
the United States) with a historic record in reporting data on ultimate investors for at 
least three years, as of 2016 (see also figure 2).
For six large recipient countries in the sample, figure 5 shows a comparison between 
the distribution of the ultimate investors reported by the country, the distribution of 
bilateral FDI (direct investors) and the distribution of the ultimate investors estimated 
by the probabilistic approach. In all cases, and particularly for Germany, France, 
Switzerland and the Czech Republic, the estimated distribution proxies the reported 
distribution of ultimate investors much better than does the distribution of bilateral 
FDI. In particular, the methodology takes care of the most relevant conduit schemes 
– such as those involving the Netherlands and Luxembourg – that play a major role 
in the diversion of bilateral FDI from the origin of the investment. The application 
of the probabilistic approach re-establishes realistic ranking between the investors, 
not only aligned with reported data on ultimate investors but also consistent with 
the economic size of the countries. The results for the other six countries in the 
benchmark are similar.
Figure 6 compares for all twelve countries the total variation distance between the 
distribution of bilateral FDI and the distribution of ultimate investors with the distance 
between the estimated distribution and the reported distribution of the ultimate 
investors. For all countries the estimated distribution more closely approximates the 
reported distribution than standard bilateral FDI. In eight out of twelve cases, the 
improvement is considerable, with a decrease in total variation distance over 40%.
The good results in figures 5 and 6 are even more promising considering the ample 
scope for refinement of the methodology. Some directions for future improvements 
are discussed in the next section 4.
11 Primary source UNCTAD internal data; complemented by OECD statistics (https://stats.oecd.org) 
and data from IMF Coordinated Direct Investment Surves (http://data.imf.org).
12 https://stats.oecd.org.
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Figure 5. Comparison between reported positions by ultimate investors, 
 reported positions by direct investors (bilateral FDI) and estimated 
 positions by ultimate investors  (Selected recipient countries, per cent) 
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 positions by ultimate investors  (Selected recipient countries, per cent) 
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Notes: Reported data on positions by ultimate investors and by direct investors from the OECD (https://stats.oecd.org), December 2018. 
For each recipient country, the top ten (reported) ultimate investors were selected.
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4. Limitations and future directions
Issues: country-specific effects and round-tripping
Notwithstanding encouraging results presented in section 3, figure 5 also exposes 
some of the limitations of the methodology. A major one is related to the ability 
to capture country-specific effects. The methodology works well to remove more 
systematic and cross-cutting ‘conduit noise’ affecting bilateral FDI. However, the 
approach struggles to capture country-specific issues. An example is the role of 
Irish investment in the United States. In figure 5, Ireland features as a relatively 
large ultimate investor in United States, while it is generally considered, and indeed 
is treated by the methodology, as a conduit jurisdiction. A likely explanation for 
this effect is the recent wave of re-domiciliation of MNE parents from the United 
States to Ireland as a consequence of tax inversion. In this case, the probabilistic 
approach, capturing the systemic conduit role of Ireland in international investment, 
points the computation in the wrong direction, and amplifies the gap with the 
reported data of ultimate investors. Reassuringly, comparing the distributions 
across all countries, the anomalies are limited, while the effect of systemic conduit 
schemes, such as those involving the Netherlands and Luxembourg, is marked. A 
second issue concerns the treatment of round-tripping. Unlike standard bilateral 
FDI, the probabilistic approach allows for the possibility of round-tripping. However, 
the estimates of its share tend to be systematically biased, too small where round-
tripping is more relevant (for example in Germany or Italy) or too large where it is 
relatively limited (United States). In the rest of this section, I will discuss potential 
remedies for these issues, focusing in particular on two interesting directions of 
research: the refinement of the calibration of the conduit probabilities and the 
relaxation of the Markov property to allow path-dependence.
Calibrating conduit probabilities
The main focus of this paper is on the computational machine, i.e. on setting 
up the modelling approach and the computational procedure that generate 
a good estimate of the distribution of ultimate investors given reasonably 
realistic inputs. The main inputs in this context are the distribution of direct 
investors, denoted by pd, and the probability of conduit investment, pc. The 
results’ accuracy depends critically on how well the parameters are assigned. 
The empirical application of section 3 employs some simple parametrization, 
whereby d is derived from bilateral FDI (26) and c employs a refined version of 
the approach in Bolwijn et al. (2018) (see appendix). The treatment of d is not 
particularly problematic as (26) seems an obvious choice. The second parameter 
c, the conduit probability, is more challenging and subject to improvement. 
The approach of Bolwijn et al. (2018) is only one possible way to size conduit FDI; 
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alternative approaches include World Investment Report (2015); Damgaard and 
Elkjaer (2017); Borga and Caliandro (2018). It would be useful to compare the results 
of the probabilistic approach across alternative methods. An attractive option could 
also be to combine the approach in World Investment Report (2015) or Bolwijn et 
al. (2018), focusing on SPE-related conduit FDI, with Borga and Caliandro (2018) 
targeting conduit investment through operational (non-SPE) entities. Departing 
from existing methods, bolder options could also be explored. In the current 
specification, conduit probabilities are assigned at the level of individual investors 
based on the conduit role that the jurisdiction plays in the overall international 
investment network. This approach is essentially driven by big numbers. It puts 
at the centre of the analysis the global investment hubs and allows for the major 
conduit structures – either affecting many recipient countries or some very large 
ones – to be captured. There are, however, country-specific issues that the method 
may fail to address. In the case of Irish investment in the United States described 
above, a jurisdiction (Ireland) that generally behaves as conduit plays the role of 
ultimate investor for a specific recipient (United States). Vice versa, some investor 
countries that do not appear as large conduits in the global picture may play that 
role for a specific recipient. Capturing such country-specific dynamics would require 
finding a way to estimate conduit probabilities c not only by investor countries i 
( c(i)) as in the current formulation, but also by recipient country j ( c(j, i)). 
This would provide a much more granular picture of conduit FDI, and ultimately a 
more accurate profile of ultimate investors.
Relaxing Markov property to allow path-dependence
Over and above the improvements in the calibration of the parameters, the 
probabilistic approach itself (the ‘computational machine’) can be tuned. I discuss 
here one potential direction, dealing with the hypothesis of Markovianity (2). Condition 
(2) applied to the reversed investment process implies that the distribution of direct 
investors depends exclusively on the immediate recipient and not on other links 
downstream in the investment chain. In other words, it requires to ‘forget’ what is 
already known about the reversed investment process and focus only on the very 
last step of the Markov chain (the ‘highest investor’). This assumption is particularly 
useful because it allows for the problem to be framed within the standard analytical 
setting of Markov chains, significantly reducing the modelling and computational 
complexity. However, in certain cases, the memoryless feature of Markov chains is 
particularly restrictive. One notable case is round-tripping, where, in fact, the results 
of the probabilistic approach tend to poorly match reported data (figure 5). Because 
of the Markov property, the approach does not recognize round-tripping as a 
special case. Round-tripping results mechanically when ultimate investors coincide 
with final recipients. In other words, round-tripping is not treated as a special 
case, i.e. differently from any other potential realization of the investment process. 
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This explains the under-estimation of round-tripping for those countries that are 
more prone to these practices and the over-estimation for countries for which 
round-tripping is relatively less relevant. Relaxing the Markov property to allow some 
path-dependence is an option that warrant further consideration, paying attention, 
however, to the trade-off between the marginal improvement in the results and 
the increase in computational and modelling complexity. Another, more pragmatic, 
option to deal with round-tripping is to assign a round-tripping probability ex-ante, 
aside from the computational approach, based on outside-in information on the 
individual countries (there is quite rich anecdotal and country-specific information 
on round-tripping, see for example Geng, 2004; Ledyaeva et al., 2015).
5. Conclusions and policy implications
This paper proposes a methodology to compute the distribution of ultimate investors 
for the set of recipient countries covered by inward bilateral FDI (including more 
than 100 countries, exceeding 95% of total FDI stock). The approach combines 
the information provided by bilateral FDI with assumptions on conduit investment 
to link final recipients and ultimate investors (reversed investment process). The 
investment dynamics implied by the reversed investment process can be modelled 
as an absorbing Markov chain where the absorbing states act as ultimate investors. 
For each starting point (recipient country), the limiting probability of absorbing states 
– analitically available – corresponds to the target distribution of ultimate investors. 
Comparison with the actual distribution of ultimate investors for twelve countries 
reporting this information shows that the methodology effectively looks through 
the main conduit jurisdictions providing a good approximation of the distribution of 
ultimate investors.
FDI statistics are first and foremost a picture of economic and financial integration 
among countries. Together with trade data and, more recently, GVC data they 
are the key indicators of the positioning of a country in the global economy. In a 
globalized world, these types of data are the empirical basis for many decisions of 
economic policy at the national and international level. FDI by ultimate investors 
add to countries’ data equipment a key perspective on the underlying business 
linkages and ‘real’ financial and productive inter-dependencies, cleared of the 
‘noise’ generated by financial intermediation. Such a perspective is not only 
complementary to standard FDI statistics but can, and increasingly does, provide 
alternative insights. Such insights have key implications for different areas of 
policymaking including investment and trade policies and international taxation.
One notable example concerns the investment effects of trade tensions between 
the United States and China. The impact on intra-firm trade between United States 
MNEs and their Chinese foreign affiliates can only be fully appreciated when the 
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exposure of Chinese FDI to United States investors is assessed through the lens of 
ultimate investors. In fact, the U.S. share of Chinese official inward FDI is low, at 3% of 
total FDI stock, due to the ‘filter’ imposed by conduit FDI, particularly through Hong 
Kong. Reassessing ultimate investors’ weight through the probabilistic approach 
brings the U.S. share to 12%,13 establishing the United States as the largest global 
investor in China. Interestingly, in another major international quandary such as 
Brexit, the ultimate investor analysis points in a different direction. The view by 
ultimate investor neutralizes the amplifying effect of European conduit jurisdictions 
and puts in perspective the share of European Union as investor in the United 
Kingdom, at 32%,14 a sizable share but lower than the 41% indicated by standard 
bilateral FDI (2016 data).
More generally, international trade and investment treaties are formulated and 
scoped based on the nationality of the parties. In investment treaties, the main 
counterpart to focus on would be the investment decision maker, i.e. the ultimate 
investor. However, the presence of intermediate jurisdictions augments and blurs 
the scope of international treaties, producing a de facto multilateralizing effect. The 
World Investment Report (2016) argued that up to a third of apparently intra-regional 
foreign affiliates in major (prospective)15 mega-regional treaty areas, such as the 
Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP), the Transatlantic Trade and Investment Partnership 
(TTIP) and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), would be 
ultimately owned by parents outside the region, raising questions about the ultimate 
beneficiaries of negotiations and treaties. In reality, what often happens is that 
intermediate investment routes follow the network of bilateral treaties, particularly 
Double Taxation Treaties (DTTs) and Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) – a well 
documented practice known as ‘treaty shopping’ (World Investment Report, 2016). 
From the perspective of a country involved in treaty negotiations or monitoring, and 
particularly for developing countries that are more exposed to the risk of information 
asymmetry, complete data and information, including on ultimate investors, are 
key elements for a ‘deeper’ analysis of investment relations to better inform treaty 
making. While developing the technical capabilities to collect this type of data, the 
probabilistic approach presented in this paper can provide reliable and relatively 
accessible estimates.
Likewise, at the level of national investment policies, any strategy aimed at 
attracting foreign investment (or boosting outward investment) should rely on a 
comprehensive view of the overall investment network in which the country is 
13 Result from the empirical application of the probabilistic approach of section 3.
14 Result from the empirical application of the probabilistic approach of section 3. Estimated share in 
line with the share resulting from the data on ultimate investors reported by the UK National Statistics 
(https://www.ons.gov.uk).
15 Under discussion at the time of the WIR16 analysis.
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embedded. Such view should go beyond the first layer of immediate investors 
or recipients and extend to ultimate investors where investment decisions are 
made (or, correspondingly, final recipients, where the actual productive activity 
takes place). From a more theoretical but related perspective, policy strategies 
for attracting FDI have traditionally been grounded in rich econometric literature 
on FDI drivers and determinants that often use standard bilateral FDI as empirical 
basis for gravity-type equations. In this context, employing as dependent variable 
bilateral links based on ultimate investors may lead to additional insights and 
inputs into investment policymaking.
International taxation is another natural policy area for the application of this study. 
The most important, although not unique, motivation of conduit FDI is MNE fiscal 
optimization and international tax avoidance (Bolwijn et al., 2018; Janský and 
Palanský, 2018). Studies on the link between FDI and tax avoidance focus on the 
relationship between conduit jurisdictions and recipient countries, and tend to 
overlook the role of home countries, partly due to a lack of data connecting conduit 
FDI to ultimate investors. However, as pointed out by the World Investment Report 
(2015), tax avoidance is a systemic issue. It involves offshore hubs that materially 
provide the legal and financial infrastructure. It affects host countries that are primarily 
affected by, but sometimes in their attempt to lure investment also complicit to, 
profit shifting. Tax avoidance also involves the home countries of investors, often 
because they do not have effective legislation in place to prevent the use of hub-
based structures or unintentionally encourage the use of such structures by their 
MNEs. The view by ultimate investors adds the home country perspective to the 
puzzle of international taxation and investment. This is an important step towards 
the effective reform of international tax legislation, requiring a truly multilateral effort, 
achievable only with the contribution and commitment of all parties involved.
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16 Anguilla, Antigua and Barbuda, Aruba, the Bahamas, Bahrain, Belize, Bermuda, British Virgin 
Islands, Cayman Islands, the Cook Islands, Cyprus, Dominica, Gibraltar, Grenada, Guernsey, Isle 
of Man, Jersey, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Malta, the Marshall Islands, Mauritius, Monaco, Montserrat, 
Nauru, Netherlands Antilles, Niue, Panama, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Seychelles, Turks and Caicos Islands, United States Virgin Islands 
and Vanuatu.
Appendix. Approach to sizing conduit probabilities
The objective of this appendix is to present the methodology for sizing conduit 
probabilities employed in the empirical application of section 3. In the context of this 
paper, the conduit probability of a given jurisdiction i is the probability that outward 
investment from i are made by a conduit entity (see definition (17) in section 2.3). 
The approach is essentially a refinement of UNCTAD approach initially introduced in 
the World Investment Report (2015) and further developed by Bolwijn et al. (2018), 
in the context of the analysis of MNE fiscal contribution and tax avoidance. The 
methodology is based on a segmentation of jurisdictions based on their conduit 
and offshore role in the global investment network.
Group 1: Tax havens. A list of 38 small jurisdictions originally defined by the OECD. 
It includes small countries whose economy is entirely, or almost entirely, dedicated 
to the provision of offshore financial services.16 Accordingly, the share of conduit 
investment in outward stock from these countries (i.e. the conduit probability) 
is 100%.
Group 2: Other investment hubs. This qualification applies to countries with 
substantial real economic activity (unlike tax havens) that also act as investment 
hubs for MNEs owing to a favorable tax and investment regime, typically granted 
through the option to operate by means of SPEs. Two subsets are identified.
Group 2a. Self-reporting SPEs. When countries themselves report outward 
investment through SPEs, the preferential choice is to use their data to assign 
the conduit probability. In this case the conduit probability is given by the ratio 
between outward investment through SPEs and total outward investment, as 
reported by the countries.
Group 2b. Estimated investment hubs. When the countries do not report 
the SPE component, the implied investment method provides a way to detect 
relevant investment hubs and estimate their conduit component. The method 
is based on the assumption of a linear relationship between GDP and FDI, or 
in other words, a relationship between the size of an economy and its (inward 
and outward) investment. Such straightforward relationship (supported by very 
high correlation coefficients) is broken when jurisdictions with a large share of 
conduit FDI are involved, because these investment are mainly financial and 
do not fully translate into GDP creation. A natural way to proceed is then to 
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define a band (confidence interval) around the regression line corresponding to 
the normal relationship between GDP (x-axis) and (outward) FDI (y-axis), at a 
certain sufficiently high probability p. It is assumed that observations lying above 
the band are over-sized because of significant presence of conduit FDI, hence 
identifying the large investment hubs. For these hubs, the conduit component 
responsible for the outsize amount of FDI can be estimated as the delta 
between the observation and the corresponding upper band of the confidence 
interval, i.e. the additional FDI component that qualifies the jurisdiction as 
conduit. (Another, less conservative, option would be to calculate the conduit 
component as the delta between the observed value and the regression line.)
Group 3. Non-conduit jurisdictions. All jurisdictions that do not fall in the group 
1 or 2 are assumed to have no conduit FDI, or equivalently, are assigned a conduit 
probability equal to 0.
Expression (27) summarizes the parametrization of the conduit probabilities pc 
resulting from the application of this approach:
If i is a tax haven (Group 1)
If i reports SPEs (Group 2a)
If i is large hub but not reporting SPEs (Group 2b) 
Otherwise (Group 3)
  (27)
where SPEout(i) is the total amount of outward investment made by SPEs in 
country  i; FDIout(i) is the total amount of outward FDI from country i. Thus the 
second row in (27) is the share of investment made by SPEs (conduit entity) in total 
outward investment from country i, as reported by i. Instead, IMPL(i) in the third 
row denotes the conduit component estimated through the implied investment 
method described above.
This approach improves on the approach introduced in the World Investment 
Report (2015) and Bolwijn et al. (2018) in two aspects. First, it extends the 
scope of self-reporting SPEs from four countries (Austria, Hungary, Luxembourg 
and the Netherlands) to fourteen countries reporting SPEs, fully acknowledging 
and exploiting all available information (group 2a). Furthermore, it refines the 
methodology to select and size estimated hubs (group 2b). The original formulation 
of World Investment Report (2015) and Bolwijn et al. (2018) relied on some heuristic 
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17 The illustrated methodology based on conﬁdence intervals is equivalent to using studentized residual 
for the detection of the outliers, a standard approach to the identiﬁcation of outliers in a linear 
regression setting.
For group 1: see note 16. For group 2a: the list of reporting jurisdictions and the corresponding shares of outward SPEs is based on 
2016 data reported by OECD (https://stats.oecd.org/), as of February 2018. For group 2b: selection of jurisdictions and estimates 
of conduit probabilities are based on the implied investment method (threshold probability for confidence interval at 0.9) with data 
for GDP and outward FDI stock from UNCTADStat. For simplicity, estimated investment hubs are limited to large jurisdictions, i. e. in 
the first quartile in terms of outward stock, covering around 99% of the total FDI stock. For Hong Kong, the estimate of the conduit 
probability is consistent with the share of business activities in outward FDI reported by Hong Kong national statistics (at 78% of total 
outward FDI according to the latest data, 2015). Countries not listed in the table are assigned conduit probability equal to 0 (group 3).
Table 1.  Conduit probabilities by jurisdiction
Group Jurisdictions c  (Per cent)
1. Tax Havens 38 jurisdictions 100
2a. Self-reporting SPEs
Luxembourg
Hungary
Netherlands
Iceland
United Kingdom
Portugal
Denmark
Switzerland
Spain
Estonia
Sweden
Belgium
Norway
95
87
73
37
21
15
13
9
7
6
5
4
2
2b. Estimated hubs
Hong Kong
Ireland
Singapore
78
65
57
criteria to identify large hubs, based on threshold for the ratio between FDI stock 
and GDP (conveniently set at 1). Once the conduit jurisdictions were identified, 
then the size of the conduit component was trivially given by the delta between the 
actual level of FDI and the GDP-implied level as estimated by the regression line. In 
the current formulation, the selection of the large hubs is based on a more robust 
statistical approach17 and the sizing of the conduit component follows directly from 
the same procedure.
Table 1 provides for each selected conduit jurisdiction the resulting share of conduit 
FDI (i.e. the conduit probabilities).
